The imbalances between supply and demand drive international trade in natural gas. On the one hand are northeast Asian countries (i.e. Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China), which hold just over 1 per cent of world's reserves but account for almost 8 per cent of the demand. On the other hand, the Middle East (particularly Iran and Qatar) and Russia have two-thirds of the world's reserves and account for around 25 per cent of the demand in (BP, 2009 ). Natural gas is also becoming an increasingly global commodity. In the past, gas has tended to be used in the region where it is produced because of the relatively high transport costs. However, technical developments have led to a drastic reduction in gas liquefaction and transport costs making liquefied natural gas (LNG) competitive with traditional pipeline gas. The rapid growth in LNG use and its greater flexibility has started to create a global market for gas. In 2008, approximately 27 per cent of the global natural gas supply was internationally traded with LNG shipments showing strong growth, well above the ten-year average and making up more than 28 per cent of total export volume (BP, 2009) . The remaining share of gas sold on the world energy market is distributed via gas pipelines.
In 2008, about 11 per cent of the Asia-Pacific primary energy consumption was based on natural gas. Gas market requirements are mostly met through imports, 90 per cent of which is LNG from Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Australia and the Middle East. Japan and Korea are almost entirely dependent on LNG imports for their gas supplies. In Japan and Korea, imported gas exchanges are based on long term contracts of 20 to 25 years and indexation clauses where the gas price is directly linked to the price of crude oil, including relatively strict clauses such as take-or-pay clauses which require importers to pay for the gas even if their deliveries are interrupted. In Australia and New Zealand, prices are set by gas-on-gas or gas-on-coal competition (IAEE, 2007; IEA, 2007; BP 2009 ).
Short-term security of gas supply is the availability of gas supply despite exceptional demand and difficult supply conditions including disruptions to supply due to physical or economic factors. Physical disruptions can occur when gas supply is exhausted or gas production is stopped. Economic disruptions can be caused by dramatic gas price fluctuations which in turn, are due to physical disruptions or unanticipated price changes associated with speculative reaction to potential disruption.
Long-term security of gas supply on the other hand, is the ability to ensure that future gas demand can be met by a combination of domestic and imported gas supplies. Disruptions to long term security of supply are caused by inadequate investments in production and transmission infrastructure, lack of supply diversity and risks associated with import dependency which are geopolitical in nature. Gas-importing countries have started to examine available responses to disruptions to ensure security of gas supply (Dolader, 2003; Costantini, et al., 2007) .
The objective of this paper is to evaluate a set of gas supply security indicators including gas intensity, net gas import dependency, ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas consumption and geopolitical risk for seven gas-importing countries in Asia for the year 2008. It proposes a composite gas supply security index (GSSI) that is derived as the root mean square of the scaled values of four security of gas supply indicators (Gnansounou, 2008) . The four security of gas supply indicators are interrelated and that the GSSI derived provides a composite quantitative measure of gas security by taking into account the interactions and interdependence between the identified set of indicators. The GSSI captures the sensitivity of the Asian economies to developments in the international gas market, with a higher index indicating higher gas supply insecurity or vulnerability. The existing literature does not identify a unique methodology to assess and quantify energy security that is factual, objective, unbiased, transparent and accessible. This paper, however, is important in terms of providing metrics by evaluating a set of parameters and indicators to assess overall natural gas supply security in seven Asian economies. It is important for future policy making to benchmark countries against quantified indicators and assess their gas security of supply weakness.
The seven net gas-importing countries included in this study are Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Singapore and Thailand, which together account for more than 75 per cent of the total gas consumption in the Asia-Pacific in 2008 (BP, 2009 ). The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on energy supply security, particularly focused on identifying the various indicators used in the literature to indicate energy vulnerability. Section 3 proposes and derives a composite gas supply security index and Section 4 evalua4tes this index for the seven countries in our sample and presents our results and analysis. The final section concludes.
Review of existing literature on energy security and its indicators
To date, the literature on assessing energy security has concentrated on oil and mostly on industrialised countries. A number of studies have tried to develop a set of energy supply security indicators to account for both short-and long-term disruptions. Although a number of indicators have been proposed in the literature, there is no consensus on a set of relevant indicators. As a result, time series data to directly assess trends in energy supply security are not readily available and policymakers have therefore relied on a number of parameters associated with energy security to inform decision making. Jansen, et. al. (2004) studied the energy supply security issue in the European Union by constructing four long-term energy security indicators based on the Shannon diversity index applied to eight primary energy supply sources (coal, oil, gas, modern and traditional biofuels, nuclear, renewables and hydropower). The indicators accounted for supply security aspects such as diversification of energy sources in energy supply, diversification of imports with respect to imported energy sources, political stability in import sources, and the resource base in import sources.
Similarly, Costantini, et. al. (2007) grouped indicators of supply security into two categories: dependence and vulnerability represented in physical and economic terms.
The distinction between dependence and vulnerability was made and in their study, the physical dimension of dependence was represented with indicators such as percentage share of net import of oil and gas in total primary energy supply and share of European oil and gas imports in world oil and gas imports while the physical dimension of vulnerability was calculated in terms of degree of supply concentration in trade and production using the Shannon-Weiner diversity index, percentage share of oil used in transportation, and percentage share of electricity produced with gas. In terms of the economic dimension of dependence and vulnerability, the value of oil and gas imports and oil and gas consumption per dollar of GDP respectively, were estimated. These indicators of the European energy system were analysed under different energy scenarios.
In a study by de Jong, et. al. (2007) A number of studies have focused on assessing energy vulnerability. Kendell (1998) The design of a composite index of energy security has been undertaken in previous studies. A composite vulnerability index was developed by the World Energy Council (2008) to benchmark and monitor European countries' respective efforts to cope with long-term energy vulnerability. Similarly, de Jong, et. al. (2007) designed state-of-the-art indexes of energy security risk (ie., the Crisis Capability Index and Supply/Demand Index) which are oriented towards a comprehensive and analytical representation of the energy supply chain. However, the shortcoming of these approaches was the use of subjective-opinion-dominated weighting systems and scoring rules where the weights and the rules were based on expert judgements. In response to this shortcoming, Gnansounou (2008) proposed an alternative method which was objective-value-oriented and statisticsbased. Gnansounou defined the composite index as the Euclidean distance to the best energy security case represented by the zero point. The Euclidean distance is standardised in order to get a value between 0 and 1.
Constructing the GSSI for the Asian gas market
The oil shocks in the 1970s demonstrated how vulnerable the world's economy was to supply interruptions and price volatility. Any energy infrastructure, oil, coal or natural gas, is often vulnerable to disruption by insufficient supply, accident or malice.
Terrorism, technical mishap, or natural disasters that damage the energy system could be nearly as devastating as a sizeable war. Inadequate financial resources also increase vulnerability or insecurity by limiting supply, transmission, and reliability while increasing prices of energy imports adversely affect the macroeconomic balance of payments, contribute inflationary pressures, and displace other consumption and investment because short-term demand is inelastic. In the past, long term contracts between exporters and importers are an important element of security of supply (Czernie, 2002) . However, in the last several years long terms contracts are not adequate assurance of uninterrupted deliveries. There has been a strong trend towards shorter contract terms or a considerable decrease in the length of natural gas contracts caused by either marketrelated or regulatory-related changes. Market changes due to federal regulatory initiatives and the creation of competitive markets in natural gas and transmission have led to this trend (Petrash, 2006) .
In line with the analyses made in previous literature, four distinct security of supply indicators were selected for this study: gas intensity (G 1 ), net gas import dependency (G 2 ), ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas consumption (G 3 ) and geopolitical risk (G 4 ). G 1 is measured as the ratio of gas consumed in an economy to gross domestic product (GDP). It is the amount of natural gas needed to produce a dollar's worth of goods and services and provides an indication of efficient use of gas to produce the economy's output. G 2 is expressed as the ratio of net imported gas consumption to total primary energy consumption. G 3 is measured as the ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas consumption. Domestic production is a better indicator of the country's capacity to cope with short-term supply disruption than domestic reserves as production excludes gas from stranded reserves which cannot be tapped immediately. G 4 represents the exposure of an economy to political risk and is measured on the basis of two factors: diversification of gas import sources and political stability in gas-exporting countries. The details of the method of calculation of these indicators are provided in the Appendix. Appendix Table 1 presents estimates of the four security of supply indicators of seven net gas importing countries in Asia.
High gas intensity of GDP results in larger adjustments costs and impacts on gas supply security in the event of natural gas supply shocks. In addition, the higher the share of imported gas in total energy demand the more vulnerable an economy is to international gas developments. Diversification of supply sources, particularly politically stable supply sources also reduces the risk and vulnerability to disruption. Dependence on domestically-sourced gas supply is preferred over imported gas, as it avoids geopolitical uncertainties. In addition, the larger domestic gas reserves relative to consumption or the larger domestic production capabilities a country has, the lesser are the likely impacts on gas security.
It is difficult to quantify a country's overall gas supply security using individual indicators and it is even more difficult to synthesise different indicators. To facilitate comparison or aggregation of several indicators, it may be better for these to be expressed in the same units. To do this, for each of the four security indicators, a relative indicator i ϕ , was estimated which was used to compute a composite index -gas supply security index (GSSI). The relative indicators were estimated by using a scaling technique where the minimum value is set to 0 and the maximum to 1. The value of 0 is assigned to the country with the least vulnerability or insecurity to supply disruptions and the value 1 is assigned to the country with the most vulnerability to supply shocks. ϕ is the relative indicator or scaled value for G 3 (ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas consumption); 4 ϕ is the relative indicator or scaled value for G 4 (geopolitical risk).
Following Gnansounou (2008) , the gas supply security index (GSSI) 
The various relative indicators of gas security are interrelated and that the GSSI derived provides a composite quantitative measure of gas security by taking into account the interactions and interdependence between the identified set of indicators. The GSSI captures the sensitivity of the Asian economies to developments in the international gas market, with a higher index indicating higher gas supply insecurity or vulnerability.
Empirical results
In this paper, the GSSI was estimated for seven Asian net gas-importing economies of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Singapore and Thailand for 2008. The final values of GSSI for our sample net gas-importing countries in Asia are shown in Figure 1 . In our sample, India is least vulnerable in the event of a natural gas supply disruption. It registered the lowest GSSI at 0.302. The strength of this country is on G 2 indicating a relatively low gas import dependency, and to a less extent on G 1 for having low gas intensity. In India, natural gas is a minor fuel in the overall energy mix representing only of the economy's GDP is low. However, India's consumption of natural gas has risen faster than any other fuel. The power and fertiliser industries are the key demand drivers for natural gas. With domestic gas production only large enough to satisfy almost threequarters of its domestic gas consumption, India's domestic natural gas supply is not likely to keep pace with demand. Despite major new natural gas discoveries in recent years, the country will have to import more, either via pipeline or as LNG. With an increase in the demand and supply for natural gas and with multiple new players entering the market, the Indian government's Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act of 2006 has promoted competition among market players and stabilised natural gas supply (Thacker, 2006 ).
The bulk of India's natural gas production comes from the western offshore regions, China ranked 2 nd as less gas-vulnerable country in the sample. China's major strengths are on G 1 , G 2 and G 3 . Its only weakness is on G 4 . China is rich in energy resources, particularly coal. Natural gas consumption in China is significantly less than other fossil fuels. Natural gas generally occupies a very small share (3.6 per cent in 2008) in China's energy mix and use of domestic gas production is limited to areas near production sites such as in Sichuan, Liaoning and Heilongjiang Provinces, where low cost gas is possible.
Despite an almost 10 per cent increase in domestic production of natural gas in 2008, coal and oil resources were utilised more extensively than natural gas for power generation and industrial development purposes. Natural gas is primarily used as a feed stock for chemical fertiliser and to operate oil and gas fields. China's major gas fields are located in the western part of the country, making transport to eastern demand centres difficult.
Gas use in China is still small but is expected to double by 2030 (Komiyama, et.al., 2005; APERC, 2008) . This growth will be driven mainly by the increased use of gas for power generation and increased residential consumption in urban areas. While some of the rising demand will be fulfilled through increases in domestic production, a large portion will come from pipeline and LNG imports. Due to geographical accessibility, the small amount of imported LNG goes to southern provinces along the coast like Guangdong and Of the seven sample countries, Taiwan ranked 3 rd with a GSSI of 0.662. Its major weakness is on G 3 due to a very limited amount of domestic gas production and indeed has very limited domestic energy resources. As Taiwan lacks sufficient domestic energy sources, it is almost totally dependent on energy imports. There is no coal and oil reserves and natural gas resources are limited at around 0.4 billion cubic metres in 2008.
Its strength on G 1 as having low gas intensity is because oil is by far the dominant fuel in Japan ranked 5 th in terms of gas supply vulnerability in the event of a supply disruption. It registered a GSSI of 0.707. Japan's security of supply profile is relatively weak on G 2 which is a measure of net import dependency, and G 3 which is the ratio of domestic production to domestic consumption of natural gas. Like Korea, Japan does not have significant domestic natural gas reserves and production, and gas is imported in the form of LNG. Of the total primary energy consumption in 2008, approximately 16 per cent is imported natural gas. Japan's demand for natural gas has been increasing rapidly at an average annual growth rate of 4.3 per cent between 1980 and 2008. This is due mainly to the revision of the Gas Utility Industry Law where there has been increased competition in the industry as market entry and prices have been deregulated. In 2008, Japan imported 98 per cent of its gas requirements and domestic demand was met almost entirely by LNG. LNG imports into Japan comprised 41 per cent of total world LNG trade, which mostly come from Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Australia and Qatar. Natural gas is mainly used for electricity generation, reticulated city gas and industrial fuels.
Since Japan has placed priority on the stable and secure supply of LNG, Japanese LNG buyers have been in general paying a higher price than buyers in Europe or the United
States under the long-term take or pay contracts with rigid terms on volume and price.
Japan lacks a national pipeline network which could interconnect its consuming areas.
The possibility of a significant disruption at one LNG terminal in Japan poses a potential supply vulnerability issue.
Despite its strength on G 3 , Thailand is the second most vulnerable country in our sample in the event of a supply shock. Thailand is endowed with production and reserves of natural gas, about 94 per cent of which is found in the Gulf of Thailand. Supply sources of natural gas are both from domestic fields and piped imports from Myanmar, though LNG remains a long-term option for Thailand. Imports of LNG have been confirmed with the planned construction of a receiving terminal on the east coast of the country by 2011, with supply coming from Iran. Additional supply of natural gas is also expected from the Malaysia -Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA) (EIA, 2007c). Thailand's relative weakness in G 4 is due to having only one source of imports with a very low political stability rating. Its economy's high gas dependence in power generation is evident in its relative weakness in G 1 which makes it vulnerable to supply shocks.
Thailand uses 74 per cent of its natural gas supply for power generation and 70 per cent of its power comes from gas-based technology (Nakawiro and Bhattacharyya, 2007 ).
Thailand's high gas intensity is facilitated by a relatively well-established natural gas regulatory framework where third party access in gas transmission is quite developed and meant the existence non-discriminatory access to the gas transmission system based on tariffs reflecting costs that provide a fair and reasonable rate of return (Chandler and Padungkittimal, 2008) .
Singapore is the most vulnerable country in our sample with a GSSI of 0.775.
Singapore's gas security of supply profile is relatively weak on G 2 and G 4 but more so on G 3 . The absence of domestic gas production combined with high domestic gas consumption makes Singapore relatively vulnerable to natural gas supply disruptions. Its consumption has risen rapidly in recent years owing mostly to government programs aimed at reducing carbon dioxide and sulphur emissions and encouraged the use of natural gas for power generation and petrochemical production (EIA, 2007d) . In 2008, natural gas accounted for almost 15 per cent of Singapore's total primary energy demand.
Singapore relies entirely on imports to meet its natural gas requirements which are mainly used for power generation and petrochemical production. Around three quarters of Singapore's fuel demand for electricity production come from natural gas. With gas representing such a large share of electricity production, diversification of supply is an important issue. Currently, all of Singapore's piped natural gas imports come from Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the Energy Market Authority of Singapore is currently studying the viability of building an LNG import terminal, thereby freeing itself from dependence on neighbouring states for its natural gas supply. An agreement was also signed to supply LNG to the import terminal on Singapore's Jurong Island by 2012. (Table 2 ) and values of GSSIs to drastically change the relative vulnerability ranking of countries (Table 3) rising as a consequence of higher gas intensities and higher consumption relative to production.
Sensitivity of the GSSI to changes in values of

Conclusion
Many factors determine gas vulnerability of an economy. Domestic production, gas efficiency usage, volume and sources of gas imports are very crucial in determining an economy's vulnerability. The analysis in this paper highlights inter-country differences in individual and overall indicators of gas security which means that country differences exist with respect to vulnerability to natural gas supply disruptions. This implies that governments need to develop policy responses that directly address individual countries' weaknesses to enable them to handle natural gas supply disruptions. Policy measures should reduce the probability of supply disruptions occurring and the costs of disruptions.
For instance, India and China are relatively less vulnerable to supply disruptions compared to other countries in the sample because of their significant domestic gas production and small share of gas in its energy mix. These meant that the two countries did not have to rely on gas imports for energy generation.
Governments could implement various measures to better cope with supply disruptions and significantly mitigate their effects. For instance, gas import dependence has risks associated with price volatility, natural disaster, political blackmail and terrorism.
Imported gas supplies are either pipeline bound or sea bound LNG. These transit options are both exposed to risks but it is the degree of having viable alternative options that defines security of supply. When gas imports depend dangerously on too few sources, it raises a concern whether this is compatible with a sensible policy goal of gas supply security. This concern is exacerbated when taking geopolitical considerations into account. Hence, diversification of gas import sources is encouraged. Other diversification measures include fuel-switching and diversifying energy mix. Diversification in fuel types and sources would reduce the costs of supply disruptions by spreading the risks across different import and energy sources. As Percebois (2006) and Reymond (2007) summed it, a country which imports the majority of its gas at a sustainable cost and ensures the security of supply by well-diversified and politically-stable sources will not be vulnerable.
Governments also have the option of reducing overall gas dependence by improving gas efficiency through research and development and adoption of technologies that reduce gas consumption or increase the efficiency of gas use, technologies that facilitate gas exploration and production, and alternative processing technologies such as gas to liquids Ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas consumption ( 3 G )
where j GP is domestic natural gas production in country j and j GC is total natural gas consumed in country j.
This indicator, unlike the first two, is negatively related to gas supply vulnerability or security. A high value for G 3 means that country j is less vulnerable or less insecure to supply shocks compared to other countries in the study. To accommodate this negative relationship, the relative indicator for country j associated with 3 G ( j 3 ϕ ) is estimated as: h i = extent of political stability in exporting country i, ranging from 0 (extremely unstable) and 1 (extremely stable); and m i = share of gas imports from country i in total gas imports.
